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WHAT MONEY CANNOT BUY: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO C.R.A.C.K
Adam B. Wolf*
Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.RA.C.K.) is an organization that
pays current or former drug addicts $200 to be sterilized. While generating great
public controversy, C.1A.C.K. is expanding rapidly throughout the country. Its
clients are disproportionately poor women of color, who are coerced by the offer of
money into permanently relinquishing their reproductive rights. This Note argues
that CRA.C.K. is a program of eugenical sterilization that cannot be tolerated.
Moreover, C.I.A.C.K further violates settled national public policy by offensively
commodifying the ill-commodifiable, by demeaning women, and by starting down
a slippery slope with devastating consequences. This Note proposes legislation that
would prohibit paid sterilizations.
here we go again
history is a life and it is a death
freedom grows in life and sings of human beings'
INTRODUCTION
Two hundred dollars can buy a woman's fundamental reproduc-
tive rights. Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K),
a nonprofit organization founded three years ago by Barbara Har-
ris in Orange County, California, pays drug-addicted women to
undergo permanent or long-term birth control.2 In exchange for
$200, these women receive tubal ligations, intra-uterine devices
* Associate Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. B.A. 1998, Amherst
College; J.D. expected 2001, University of Michigan Law School. The author would like to
thank Elaine and Ira Wolf and Noah Lippe-Klein. The author also thanks Mark Rosenbaum
and the rest of the crew at the ACLU of Southern California, whose lessons and support I
truly treasure. Amandla! Ngawethu! (South African liberation cheer: "Power! The Power is
ours!").
1. MONGANE WALLY SEROTE, FREEDOM LAMENT AND SONG 69 (1997).
2. Most women opt for permanent sterilization over long-term birth control because
the entire sum of money is provided sooner to a client who undergoes permanent steriliza-
tion. For example, a client who opts for a tubal ligation receives the $200 once the
performing doctor informs C.R.A.C.K. that he conducted the procedure; a client who de-
cides to take Depo-Provera, though, receives a $25 check from C.RAC.K. every three
months, and the remainder of the consideration is paid 12 months later. See Telephone
Interview with Rodney Harris, Assistant Director of C.R.A.C.K. (Mar. 21, 2000).
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(IUDs), five years of Norplant, or one year of Depo-Provera.3 Sixty-
five percent of these women have received tubal ligations and
IUDs, for all intents and purposes permanently enjoining their re-
productive capacities.
C.R.A.C.K. is allegedly 5 a response to the alarming number of
substance-exposed infants (SEIs) born in the United States.6 In-
deed, the number of SEls is staggering, and something must be
done to combat drugs and their pernicious effects on children
(SEIs and others). Paying drug-addicted women to get sterilized,
however, is not the answer.
Even the most well-intentioned programs can have the most
horrifying consequences, as is the case with C.R.A.C.K. Some have
called C.R.A.C.K. "a thinly veiled way of coercing women ... to give
up their personal right to bear children."7 Others have dubbed it
exploitation, eugenics,' genocide,0 and social Darwinism." Moving
beyond the rhetoric, it is clear that C.R.A.CK, however well-
intentioned, promotes irreparable injury to individuals' basic lib-
erty to procreate, particularly among women of color in an
3. Men are also eligible for the program. They can receive a vasectomy for the same
monetary consideration. All but one of C.RA.C.K.'s 166 clients to date, however, have been
women. While the hundreds of potential clients currently reviewing applications for the
program include both women and men, only one man has completed and returned the
necessary paperwork. See Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity-Let the Numbers Speak for
Themselves (last modified Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.cracksterilization.com/stats/stats.html>
[hereinafter C.R.A.C.K. Statistics] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). Hence, the following discussion of C.R.A.C.K. will focus on women.
4. Ninety-four of the first 166 clients received tubal ligations and 14 opted for IUDs;
24 more chose Norplant, and 34 elected Depo-Provera. See id. While IUDs and tubal liga-
tions are technically temporary birth control devices, they remain effective until they are
surgically removed, a procedure that will likely forever remain beyond the economic means
of C.R.AC.K. clients.
5. C.RA.C.K's extension of its program to former drug addicts leads one to question
whether its stated objective is a pretext for an ulterior motive. Consider, for instance, its
eugenical effects. See infra Part II.B. Such clients are free of the drug abuse that allegedly so
concerns Barbara Harris, but are similarly being told that they should forfeit their funda-
mental right to procreate.
6. According to C.R.A.C.K's website, 12,338 SEIs were born in Los Angeles between
1992 and 1996, an average of eight every day. See C.R.A.C.K. Statistics, supra note 3.
7. Medical Ethics Cash-for-Sterilization: Will It Come to New England?, American Political
Network, Sept. 9, 1999, available inWESTLAW, Westnews Library, ALLNEWSPLUS File.
8. See Greg Barrett, Mother Cracking Down on Drug-Addicted Newborns, TULSA WoRLD,
Sept. 21, 1999, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, By Individual Publication Library,
Tulsa World File.
9. See Bruce A. Boyer, Who Is Fit to Parent, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1999, at 21, available in
LEXIS, News Library, By Individual Publication Library, Chigago Tribune File.
10. See Andy Goldberg, Paying Addicts to Not Have Kids Sparks Storm in U.S., DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 25, 1999, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library, By Individual Pub-
lication Library, Deutsche Presse-Agentur File.
11. See Barrett, supra note 8, at 5.
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economically vulnerable class. 12 Its bare essentials reveal a program
that targets desperate women whose fundamental right to procre-
ate is stripped away in exchange for a paltry, yet coercive, sum of
money.
This Note argues that C.R.A.C.K violates public policy and that
legislation should be enacted to put an end to C.R.A.C.K. and its
effects. Part I describes the C.R.A.C.K. program and chronicles its
ongoing expansion throughout the country. Part II examines how
C.R.A.C.K. fits in with the public policy of the country, as set forth
in federal and state legislation and published opinions. Part III ex-
plores judicial and legislative approaches to prohibiting C.R.A.C.K.
sterilizations. This Note concludes that legislation is the proper
method by which to eliminate paid sterilizations and proposes such
a bill.
C.R.A.C.K., which is expanding rapidly throughout the country
despite widespread international disapproval (as well as some ac-
claim), has faced no legal challenges. However, C.R.A.C.K. imposes
a serious limitation on individuals' and society's ability to assert
fundamental claims to personhood. Therefore, the C.R.A.C.K.
program must be abolished.'3
12. Poor people of color, youth, and disabled individuals are logically the most likely
to suffer from the abuse, undue influence, and coercion of C.RA.C.K. and C.R.A.C.K.-like
programs. See generally Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 Am. J.L. & MED. 45,
83, 100 (1995) (pointing out that socioeconomic circumstances render poor people more
likely to sell their organs). For similar reasons, the same is true for paid sterilizations. As the
issue of paid sterilization has not been litigated or legislated, this Note will frequently invoke
responses to analogous programs, such as paid surrogacy, paid adoptions, and organ selling,
all of which concern the purchase of human reproductive capabilities or other items and
attributes central to personhood, or that which is "integral to the self." Katherine Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84 (1997).
13. This Note recognizes that exigent circumstances do exist regarding the problem of
unwanted children, lack of proper parental care, and SEIs, but it seeks to analyze only one
response to the problem: C.R.A.C.K.. Therefore, the only conclusion drawn is that
C.RAC.K. is not an appropriate solution. It does not consider the benefits and drawbacks of
other proposed remedies, including greater publicity of states' free reproductive health
services and clinics that provide free birth control, information sessions, and drug rehabilita-
tion.
Speaking in front of the House of Representatives regarding the commodification of or-
gans, Dr. Arthur Caplan said, "[s]urely our society can provide better ways for solving the
problems of. poverty, unemployment, and desperate need than by encouraging people
through matters of public policy and law to sell vital organs, or families to parcel out the
bodily remains of their loved ones to the highest bidder." Procurement and Allocation of Hu-
man Organs for Transplantation: Hearings on H.R 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 355-56 (1983) (statement
of Dr. Arthur Caplan, Associate for the Humanities, The Hastings Center). The same could
be said of C.R.A.C.K.. There must be more acceptable methods to deal with drug abuse and
parental responsibility than to entice women to sell their reproductive rights.
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I. C.R.A.C.K.
"If You Are Addicted To Drugs, Get Birth Control-Get $200
Cash" plead billboards and bumper stickers across the country. 4
Far from being placed randomly throughout the nation, they are
positioned strategically in low-income, minority neighborhoods, 15
often at bus stops or welfare agencies. '6 This advertising campaign
targets women in economically depressed communities of color.
Women across the country who are desperate for money have
seen these ads and are "enticed" and "blinded" into participating
in C.R.A.C.K..'7 They call a toll-free number, and a C.R.A.C.K rep-
resentative sends them paperwork to complete and return.18 One
of these forms is a contract stating that the client will receive $200
if she undergoes a sterilization.' 9 After receiving a nominal amount
of counseling by medical personnel and waiting thirty days, °
C.R.A.C.K clients select one of the four procedures endorsed by
C.R.A.C.K. within sixty days after the waiting period expires. With
documentary proof that the sterilization transpired, C.RA.C.K.,
assured that the newly-sterilized woman may never be able to re-
produce again, pays the $200 consideration.
14. See Martha Irvine, Program Pays Drug-Addicted Women $200 to Get Their Tubes Tied;
Some See Birth-Control Effort Backed by Dr. Laura as Racist, Short-Sighted, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL,
July 25, 1999, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, By Individual Publication Library, Mil-
waukee journal Sentinel File.
15. See Barrett, supra note 8, at 5.
16. C.R.A.C.K also solicits clients through fliers it sends to police departments and
jails. See Lynn Smith, Cash for Sterilization: Coercing Poor Women?, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr.
19, 1999, at 27, available in LEXIS, News Library, By Individual Publication Library, Chicago
Sun-Times File.
17. Medical Ethics, supra note 7, at 5.
18. See Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity-C.R.A.C.K.'s Prevention Project
(last modified Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.cracksterilization.com/prevention/> (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
19. See id. The paperwork sets forth the four options for sterilization. See id.
20. Some states have enacted mandatory waiting periods between the time consent to
sterilization is given and the procedure is performed. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2974
(Michie 1998) (requiring 30 day waiting period); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.347 (Michie
1998) (requiring 24 hour waiting period).
21. The money comes solely from private donations that are tax deductible. See
Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity-Donations (last modified Feb. 19, 2000)
<http://www.cracksterilization.com/donations/> (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
[VOL. 33:1&2
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
C.R.A.C.K. refuses to pay for the sterilization procedure itself.
Instead, it relies on the state to finance the operation.22 In addi-
tion, it will not pay for birth control pills or other short-term birth
control. C.R.A.C.K argues that the only way to eliminate the
problem caused by mixing drugs and procreation is to usurp the
procreative ability of drug-addicted women.
As of April 4, 2000, 165 women drug addicts or former drug ad-
dicts have accepted sterilization in exchange for the $200.25 For
most, if not all, of the clients, the money has been the motivating
factor for their sterilization.26 While $200 might not be coercive to
an average American, it is extremely coercive to poor drug ad-
dicts. 27 Barbara Harris admits this freely: the money, she says, is the
"incentive or motivation."28 One of C.R.A.C.K.'s first clients, who is
fully recovered from her drug habit, and who could clearly deliver
non-drug dependent children explicitly claims that she would not
have given up her reproductive freedom had the money not been
offered to her in a time of desperation.' Critics of the program
therefore argue that the sterilizations are not voluntary; rather,
• • 30
they are imposed on economically disadvantaged women.
22. See Program That Pays Addicts for Long-Term Birth Control Going National, ASSOCIATED
PREss NEwswIRES,July 24, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Westnews Library, ALLNEWSPLUS
File.
23. See Smith, supra note 16, at 27.
24. See Tatsha Robertson, N.H. Addicts Give Up Fertility, Pick Controversial Program Offering
$200, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1999, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, By Indi-
vidual Publication Library, The Boston Globe File.
25. See C.RA.C.K Statistics, supra note 3.
26. See Lynn Smith, Program in California Gives Cash for Sterilization, Contraception Effort
Aims to Limit Number of Children Born to Women with History of Drug Abuse, THE MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 17, 1998, at 26, available in LEXIS News Library, By Individual Publication
Library, The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel File; see also infra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
27. A recent People article observes, "[t]o a woman who is very poor and suffering
from substance abuse, $200 is a lot of money." Anne-Marie O'Neill & Kelly Carter, Desperate
Measure, PEOPLE, Sept. 27, 1999, at 145, 148 (quoting Rocio Cordoba, Staff Attorney, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Southern California).
28. Laura Mecoy, Program Gives Cash for Contraception, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, July 1,
1998, at 16, available in LEXIS News Library, Individual Publications Library, The Patriot
Ledger File.
29. Adams concedes, "I was kind of broke, so I accepted the offer." Tom Berg, Woman's
Drug-Baby Campaign Goes National, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Apr. 4, 1999, at BI,
available in 1999 WL 4293079.
30. See, e.g., Irvine, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing the comments of Steve Trombley,
President and CEO of Planned Parenthood in Chicago, who is also concerned that
C.RA.C.K. clients do not give their informed consent before undergoing the sterilizations);
Susan Dodge, Program Rewards Addicts for Taking Birth Control, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 13,
1999, at 14.
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Of C.R.A.C.K.'s sterilized clients, sixty-three percent are African-
American and Latina women,3' groups that account for only eleven
percent of the total American population. The grossly disparate
impact on women of color is obvious. They are sterilized by
C.R.A.C.K. at a rate vastly disproportionate to their representa-
tion in the United States population.
C.R.A.C.K.'s first participants resided in California, though its
client base has expanded quickly and recently to Arizona, Flor-
ida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington.3 3 Many
more states will be represented shortly, as the program contin-
ues to rapidly expand3" Through the first three weeks of August
1999, for example, C.R.A.C.K. received more than 200 requests
for paperwork from impoverished potential clients. 35 Exponen-
tially more volunteer staff and clients are joining the program
from all over the country, local offices are being developed in
large and small cities, and a national advertising campaign is
permeating communities everywhere.&
II. C.R.A.C.K.ING PUBLIC POLICY
C.R.A.C.K.'s clients are coerced into relinquishing their re-
productive rights; it is an arrangement between two parties with
grossly unequal bargaining power. The offer of $200 to the cli-
ent coerces her into agreeing to undergo a procedure that may
render her incapable of reproducing for the remainder of her
life. In order to protect future C.R.A.C.K. clients and society in
general, legislatures should intercede.
31. Seventy and 22 of the women are African-American and Latina, respectively, while
69 are Caucasian. See C.KA.C.K. Statistics, supra note 3.
32. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2000, at 383 (Robert Famighetti ed.
2000).
33. One hundred and thirty-two clients are from California, 11 from Illinois, four from
Washington, three each from New Hampshire, Florida, and Arizona, two from Minnesota,
and one each from Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See
C.R.A.C.K Statistics, supra note 3.
34. See id. (stating that "hundreds... have our paperwork and are in the process of
getting long term or permanent birth control").
35. See Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (last modified Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.cracksterilization.com> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
36. See, e.g., Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity---New Chapters (last modified Feb. 20,
2000) <http://www.cracksterilization.com/chapters/> (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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What follows are the public policy arguments against
C.R.A.C.K. paid sterilizations. Specifically, C.R.A.C.K.'s practices
commodify that which is understood to be inalienable;3 7 promote
race-based population control;3M negatively alter society's con-
ceptualization of women;" propel us down a dangerous
slippery slope; 4° and advocate the permanent relinquishment
of a vital and treasured fundamental right. 4 1 Some of the ar-
guments are stronger than others. Some will resonate more
clearly than others with certain interest groups. But each of
them, in light of prior judicial decisions and legislation, is
valuable to a legislature's review of such sterilizations. The
arguments, both individually and taken as a whole, compel
legislative action.
A. Offensive Commodification
We live in a society that is obsessed with buying and selling. In
spite of radical calls from Judge Posner 42 and his small, yet vocal,
minority, however, we cannot buy or sell anything that we want.
Some things, both courts and legislatures have repeatedly ex-
pressed, fall outside the scope of the marketplace.
One such arena in which legislatures and courts have prohib-
ited contracting out for economic consideration is family values,
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.1.
40. See infra Part II.C.2.
41. See infra Part II.D.
42. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. 1986). Judge
Posner poses an argument that we should allow alienability in such areas as children, surro-
gacy, and sex, in order to satisfy parties' expectations and to increase economic efficiency.
But see Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 87; William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of
Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1, 164-67 (1990). Responding to criticism of his approach, Posner stated that he does
not advocate a truly free market economy, but rather a regulated market in, for example,
babies and abortions. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.
L. RFv. 59, 64, 66 (1987).
Another approach is posited by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. Like Posner,
they assign economic value to the arguments in favor of and against markets in areas such as
organs. After accounting for externalities, they conclude that entitlements in these areas
should be inalienable because to allow otherwise would be economically inefficient. See
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1111-15 (1972). The authors do account for the
humanitarian theory, or the moral aversion to commodifying such areas, by assigning sig-
nificant economic value to this objection. See id at 1112 (referring to such an externality as a
"moralism").
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including reproduction, generally agreeing that society should
disfavor monetization that, like C.R.A.C.K., implicates "the
foundation stone of the social order."43 Into this category falls
the sale of intercourse (prostitution)," children , marriage,4
and surrogacy. 7 Human reproductive freedoms and the fruits
thereof are off limits to paid contractual relationships. Paid sterili-
zation, by analogy and through the policy arguments set forth
below, should likewise be deemed illegal.
In the most celebrated paid surrogacy contract case, In re Baby
M,4 the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed this idea explicitly:
"[t] here are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot
buy."9 The Court cited examples of such market-inalienable areas,
including child labor.i° Market-inalienability is the idea that some
items or attributes should not be the object of consideration, even
though they are not outside the realm of social discourse.5' They
may be given away, but not sold.
There are plenty of examples. For instance, as the Baby M court
found, we accept surrogacy, as long as it is not paid for. The same
holds true for adoptions. 2 As the Supreme Court held over thirty-
43. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 98(J), at 525 (3d ed. 1990).
44. See, e.g., State v. Grimes, 735 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a
statute criminalizing "an offer or agreement to engage in sexual conduct for a fee without
requiring that there be any further action to carry out the offer or agreement"). See generally
Murray, supra note 43, § 98(J), at 527 ("An agreement based on the performance of sexual
acts is obviously unenforceable.").
45. See, e.g., Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ga. 1951)
(holding that an arrangement by which a "mother agree [s] to surrender possession of [her]
child in consideration of a legacy... [is] void as being against public policy").
46. For a thorough discussion of the role of contracts in the institution of marriage,
see Wagner, supra note 42, at 58-80.
47. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) ("[T]he payment of money
to influence the mother's custody decision makes the agreement as to custody void....
[C]ompensated surrogacy arrangements raise the concern that, under financial pressure, a
woman will permit her body to be used and her child to be given away."); In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1248, 1250 (N.J. 1988) ("With surrogacy, the 'problem'... consisting of the
purchase of a woman's procreative capacity... is caused by and originates with the offer of
money.... [Thus,] [i]n New Jersey the surrogate mother's agreement to sell her child is
void.").
48. 537 A.2d at 1227.
49. Id. at 1249-50.
50. See id.
51. See MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1853 (1987).
52. See Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1975) (enforcing an
agreement for one party adopting a child in exchange for the other party receiving a por-
tion of decedent's estate only because "the adoption was in the best interests of the child
and pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor on the mother's pad') (emphasis added); Savan-
nah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ga. 1951) (voiding on public policy
grounds an arrangement whereby a mother promised to surrender possession of her child
for adoption in exchange for the mother receiving a portion of an estate at issue).
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five years ago, the "custody and welfare of children are not the
subject of barter."5 3 Similarly, consensual adult sexual intercourse is
not prohibited,54 except when payment is involved.55 When one en-
ters into a contract for financial gain accompanying intercourse, it
is "obviously unenforceable. In general, contracts for money are
excluded from familial institutions.57 Courts have not equivocated.
For some things, "market rhetoric [is] intuitively out of place.., so
inappropriate that it is either silly or ... insulting."58
What is the underlying principle upon which these courts have
relied? The answer can be found in the Congressional hearings
that took place prior to the passage of the National Organ Trans-
plant Act,59 which, among other things, makes it a federal offense
to receive money in exchange for an organ.' Debating the sale and
purchase of human organs, medical personnel and politicians gen-
erally agreed 61 that payment for things like human organs ought to
53. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va.
458, 477, (1938)).
54. There are two notable exceptions: some states still prohibit adultery and sodomy.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997) (prohibitng sodomy); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-19 (1999) (prohibiting adultery); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (1999) (prohibiting
adultery); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1999) (prohibiting sodomy); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-177 (1999) (prohibitng sodomy); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 1996) (prohibiting
adultery).
55. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 13A-12-110 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1200 (1998); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.82 (West 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 853-A (West 1997);
1994 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. 43.02 (West). See generally Micloe Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A
Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 69, 69 n.1 (1998) (listing statutes of all 50
states prohibiting prostitution).
56. MURRAY, supra note 43, § 98(J), at 527.
57. See Wagner, supra note 42, at 128 (asserting that contracts for marriages and par-
ent-child relationships have been prohibited).
58. Radin, supra note 51, at 1880. The view promoted in this Note should be distin-
guished from that of strict decommodification, which calls for the dismantling of the market
system altogether.
59. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994).
60. The Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, re-
ceive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." Id. at § 274e (a).
Subsection (b) imposes a penalty of a fine and/or imprisonment for violating § 274e(a),
and subsection (c), parts (1) and (3) define "human organ" and "interstate commerce,"
respectively. See id. at 274e(a), (c) (1), (c) (3). Subsection (c) (2) claims that "valuable con-
sideration" does not include the reasonable expenses incurred by an organ donor pursuant
to his or her donation. See id. at 274e(c) (2).
61. All those who opposed § 274e(a) at the hearings on the National Organ Trans-
plant Act did not attack the humanitarian basis advanced in this Note. Rather, foes of the
commodification provision were concerned that such a prohibition would actually decrease
an already alarmingly small number of donated, transplantable organs. See Procurement and
Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings on HR. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 230 (1983)
(statement of Rep. Schneider). All of the following organizations went on the record sup-
porting the provision prohibiting organ sales: American Society of Nephrology, American
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be prohibited. At stake, our legislators realized, was the monetiza-
tion of irreplaceable body parts.62 They found it offensive to make
the body, and its parts therein, an object for economic gain.63 Rep-
resentative Al Gore, then Chairman of the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight for
the Committee on Science and Technology, said in support of the
noncommodification provision:
[T]his is a practice which we must not allow in this country.
The sale of human organs runs counter to virtually every value
in our system of social and medical ethics. It blurs the distinc-
tion between people and things, as human organs become
simply another commodity to be bought and sold in the mar-
ketplace.6
Society of Transplant Surgeons, International Society of Transplant Surgeons, International
Transplantation Society, National Association of Patients on Hermodialysis and Transplanta-
tion (NAPHT), and the United States Department of Health and Human Services. See id.
62. For present purposes, I do not comment on the commodification of replenishible
fluids, although such a discussion is not wholly off point. Suffice it to say that while the sale
of human liquids, such as blood and sperm, does cheapen and commodify human life, it
seems less egregious than selling reproductive capabilities because fluids are regenerative,
and a sale leads to less "final" results. The same holds true for egg sales, which have also
traditionally been commodified. See Marsha Garrison, The Technological Family: What's New
and What's Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 702 (1999); Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations Meet a Need and
Raise Eithical Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at Al. Though some states still outlaw the
sale of blood, see National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on HR. 4080 Before the Subeomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 235 (1983)
(statement of Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman), it is now generally acceptable throughout
the country. See Banks, supra note 12, at 50. Some courts have even recognized a limited
right to sell certain bodily fluids. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979)
(declaring that a person may sell his plasma, the proceeds of which must be declared as
taxable income). Urine, skin, and samples of other body fluids are also commonly sold. See
Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MIcd. L. REv. 1182,1237 (1974).
However, such sales are frequently conducted for the purpose of promoting necessary, of-
ten life-saving, research, see id. at 1237-38 n.370, a purpose that is inapplicable to C.R.A.C.K.
sterilizations. When scientific research is the beneficiary of a sale of objects associated with
personhood, the same moral aversion is present, but it is generally muted by the extreme
value of the research. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Ca. 1990)
(refusing to recognize property rights to one's body out of concern that recognizing such
rights would have a negative effect on necessary research); Roy Hardiman, Comment, To-
ward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human
Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207, 258 (1986) (concluding that people should have limited prop-
erty rights to sell certain parts of their bodies for the purpose of research).
63. See generally Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings
on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Howe Comm. on Science
and Technology, 98th Cong. 217-19 (1983) (statement of Rep. A] Gore, Chairman of the
Subcommittee).
64. Id. at 218.
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Simply put, it is wrong to buy or sell irreplaceable body parts.5
As with C.R.A.C.K. sterilizations, such sales cheapen the sanctity of
the human body. When we put an item on the market, it a priori
becomes an object.6e In the market, "the buyer or seller (the sub-
ject) relates only to an object: all orientations are subject-object,
never subject-subject."67 In this case, the "subject" is C.R.A.C.K.,
and the "object" is its clients and their reproductive rights. Hence,
no longer do we see the women (and their associated fundamental
rights) as subjects; they are literally objectified.
To treat the human body and life as a mere commodity demeans
the dignity of humanity. We must treat a person as a human be-
ing, and not as property.69 When we understand those items that
are integral to personhood as "monetizable... [we] do violence to
our deepest understanding of what it is to be human." °
We do not view human organs as commodities like a six-pack of
soda or a ticket to a baseball game; neither should we view repro-
ductive rights in this way. Reproductive rights are, like organs, not
fungible objects. Like a human eye, a heart, or even a cadaver,7'
65. See id. at 246 (statement of Ms. Engebretsen, a mother of an organ donor recipi-
ent) ("[I]t is morally and ethically wrong to sell human body parts.... [T]his offends my
sense of right and wrong.").
66. See C. Edwin Baker, TheIdeology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
3, 35 (1975), quoted in Wagner, supra note 42, at 193 n.835.
67. Id. at 35.
68. See Organ Transplantation in International Perspective: Ethical Aspects: Hearings on HR.
4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Tech.,
98th Cong. 31, 42-43 (1983) (statement of Warren T. Reich, Professor of Bioethics, School
of Medicine and Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University).
69. See National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on HR. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 299 (1983). One
medical professor expressed this view in his testimony:
[H]uman beings are not... like automobiles, of which parts can be bought and sold.
There is something inherently offensive to the human conscience, I think, about
treating a fellow human being as a thing. We must treat fellow human beings as per-
sons and not as things, and the buying and selling of parts of human beings makes
them into things, and I think that is morally repulsive.
Id. (statement of Dr. Bernard Towers, Professor of Anatomy, Pediatrics, and Psychiatry,
UCLA Medical School); Wagner, supra note 42, at 193-94 (referring to the commodification
of children, Professor Wagner states, "[t] he child is disposed of as a [thing], not respected
as a person").
70. Radin, supra note 51, at 1905-06 (referring to the commodification of
"particulars--one's politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, ex-
periences, wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal attributes... [as] integral
to the self").
71. Similar humanitarian arguments were made in England in the early 1800s in re-
sponse to a rash of secret exhumations. See RuSSELL Scorr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 5
(1981). Graverobbers would disinter corpses to sell to medical schools for a profit (one ca-
daver brought four Guineas, or eleven times the average weekly wage at the time). See id.
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reproductive rights are not replaceable or freely exchangeable.
They are similar to an organ or an infant, which are both non-
commodifiable, "unique and irreplaceable. '72 If we prohibit the
sale of a kidney, of which every person has two but can function
normally with only one, we should prohibit paid sterilizations,
which may irreparably terminate a person's reproductive abilities.
This illegal commodification argument against C.R.A.C.K. is
even weightier when one considers that the "object" subjected to
alienation is a fundamental right. In Skinner v. Oklahoma," the Su-
preme Court stated that "the right to have offspring" is "basic to
the perpetuation of a race. 74 Reviewing Oklahoma's law requiring
certain felons to be sterilized, the Court was particularly concerned
with the "irreparable injury" to a "basic liberty." 75 Here, while the
state is not a party to the action, and while the sterilization is not
mandatory6 ---both of which were the case under the Oklahoma
sterilizations-the same concern applies: coerced by C.R.A.C.K.
money, financially desperate women suffer irreparable harm to
their basic liberty to reproduce. Such an injury is something that
courts, from Skinner forward, have been quick to protect against.
77
Whether the program receives support from the state or not, the
government, for the same policy reasons that moved the Skinner
Court, should safeguard its citizens' fundamental rights from a
program that deliberately attempts to strip them away.
This led to the passage of the British Anatomy Act of 1832, which forbade the sale of human
bodies. See id.; see also National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 293 (1983)
(statement of Dr. Robert B. Ettenger, President, American Society of Transplant Surgeons);
Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cali-
fornia and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499, 501-02 (1990).
72. Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 127, 143-44 (1986) (arguing that commercial surrogacy is coercive towards economi-
cally disadvantaged women and is akin to slavery).
73. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner is the springboard for a string of cases celebrating re-
productive rights and freedoms.
74. Id. at 536. Procreation has been considered a fundamental right by the Supreme
Court for the past 57 years. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
75. Id. at 541.
76. Participation in C.R.A.C.K falls somewhere between voluntary and mandatory.
While it is true that the women are not being forced (in the traditional understanding of
"forced") into selling their reproductive capabilities, they are being coerced and targeted by
the program. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. C.RA.C.K. coercion is similar to that
in organ sales, which also has drawn criticisim for its likely disparate impact on those in dire
economic situations. See Banks, supra note 12, at 100-01. The sellers involved in either prac-
tice are "victimized by being forced to sell their organs for needed funds." Mortinger, supra
note 71, at 508-09 (citing Note, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 393, 404-05 (1983)).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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Although no legislation has yet been enacted to challenge a pro-
gram of coerced or quasi-voluntary sterilization, numerous judicial
opinions have consistently refused to condone this type of practice.
8
Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley79 arose out of a probate action
in which a mother surrendered the possession of her child to the
husband of the testatrix for adoption in exchange for a promise to
leave the entire estate to the mother and her other children."0 The
Georgia Supreme Court, shocked by this arrangement, voided the
contract as against public policy.8' It held that any contract for the
barter of children is void, regardless of the benefits that would ac-
crue to the child as a result of the agreement.
81
An appeals court in Missouri came to the same conclusion two
years later. Responding to an arrangement whereby a mother gave
her child to the respondents as a Christmas present, the court held
that the respondents are not entitled to custody of the child pursu-
ant to this exchange, which the court viewed as a contractual
matter.8 3 "Children," the court sternly pronounced, "are not sub-
ject to barter or contract."84
More than three decades after the Georgia and Missouri cases,
the Baby M court held invalid a paid surrogacy contract entered
into between William Stem and Mary Beth Whitehead. 5 As per the
terms of the contract, Whitehead was artificially inseminated with
the sperm of Stern, whose wife could not conceive.86 Whitehead
was to receive $10,000 for carrying the fetus to term and then sur-
rendering the child to Stern and his wife.87 After Whitehead
refused to give up the baby, Stern filed a complaint in New Jersey
Superior Court to enforce the surrogacy contract.
8
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce the contract
on a number of grounds." The court held that Whitehead's con-
sent to the arrangement was not dispositive.9° It stated:
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79-98.
79. 65 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 1951).
80. See id. at 27-28.
81. See id. at 29.
82. See id.
83. See Tripp v. Brawley, 261 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
84. Id. at 511.
85. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1987).
86. See id. at 1235.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1236-37.
89. Among the reasons for the court's holding were that the contract violated statutes
that prohibit paid adoptions, require proof of parental unfitness before rescinding parental
rights, and allow the revocation of adoptions that take place in private institutions. See id. at
1240-46.
90. See id. at 1249-50.
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There are, in a civilized society, some things that money can-
not buy. In America, we decided long ago that merely because
conduct purchased by money was "voluntary" did not mean
that it was good or beyond regulation and prohibition. Em-
ployers can no longer buy labor at the lowest price they can
bargain for, even though that labor is "voluntary," or buy
women's labor for less money than paid to men for the same
job, or purchase the agreement of children to perform op-
pressive labor, or purchase the agreement of workers to
subject themselves to unsafe or unhealthful working condi-
tions. There are, in short, values that society deems more
important than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it
labor, love, or life.9'
Whether contemplating the commodification of surrogacy or
reproductive rights, consent is nearly irrelevant. Placing such
"items" on the market-assigning a monetary value to them-is
always offensive.
Though a few courts have permitted paid surrogacy, most have
not, and the Baby M decision is seen as the authoritative case hold-
ing that "hired maternity" arrangements are void as against public
policy. In one of the most recent cases to decide such an issue, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts likewise held that a paid
surrogacy contract is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.93
The relevant terms of the contract were that an infertile couple was
to pay $10,000 to a woman who, "on her own volition," would later
give birth and surrender the child to the couple.9' Ultimately, the
court, on public policy grounds, held that "the payment of money
to influence the mother's custody decision makes the agreement as
to custody void."9° It was the payment, as opposed to the idea of
surrogacy in general, that the court found most problematic:
"compensated surrogacy arrangements raise the concern that, un-
91. Id. at 1249 (citations omitted).
92. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209 (Ky. 1986) (subsequently overruled by the Kentucky legislature in Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.590(4) (Michie 1998)); In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. 1986).
93. See RR. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998).
94. The New England Surrogate Parenting Advisors (NESPA), a for-profit organization
that acts as a broker between infertile couples and women willing to be surrogates for mone-
tary gain, characterized the payment as one "for services rendered"-not one for the
purchase of a child-in an attempt to evade statutes that prohibit the sale of babies. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the difference was only semantic,
finding that "the father.., was promised more than those services because, as a practical




der financial pressure, a woman will permit her body to be used
and her child to be given away."96 It went on to say that if the
money were not a major factor in entering the agreement, the
conclusion might be different.97 However, it found that the pay-
ment was a significant motivation for the surrogate woman, 9 as it is
for the C.R.A.C.K clients, and therefore that the practice was un-
supportable.
The Ninth Circuit also focused on the element of payment. In
Reimche v. First National Bank of Nevada," the court hedged more
than the abovementioned courts, holding that a paid adoption was
enforceable when, inter alia, "pecuniary gain was not [a] motivat-
ing factor on the mother's part."'' ° Such a ruling does not change
the reasoning of the courts that have voided paid arrangements for
personhood items or attributes. If the payment is truly incidental
to the agreement, its practical and symbolic effects are minimal. In
contrast, when the motivation for entering into such an agreement
is monetary, the individual's commitment to the procedure is sus-
pect, and we cannot in good conscience honor the arrangement) °
The C.R.A.C.K. program is an example of the latter. For
C.R.A.C.K. clients, similar to most paid mothers of adoptees and
potential organ sellers, the coercion of economic gain is great.
10 2
When money provides significant motivation, items or attributes
that are inherent to our very existence cannot be commodified. It
96. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made, in effect, an argument for
market-inalienability with regard to paid surrogacy:
We recognize that there is nothing inherently unlawful in an arrangement by which an
informed woman agrees to attempt to conceive artificially and give birth to a child
whose father would be the husband of an infertile wife.... If no compensation is
paid beyond pregnancy-related expenses.., the objections we have identified in this
opinion to the enforceability ... would be overcome.
Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
97. See id. at 796-97.
98. See id. at 796.
99. 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975).
100. Id. at 189.
101. See National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 234 (1983)
(statement of Oscar Salvatierra, M.D., Professor of Surgery and Director of Pediatric Renal
Transplantation, Stanford University Medical Center).
102. See id. at 269 (Dr. Salvatierra explained: "A[n organ-selling] program would dis-
criminate against the poor, since it is the poor, or the individual with financial difficulties,
who would most likely serve as a donor."); Richard L. Barnes, An Advocate's View of the Surro-
gate Mother Problem: Suggested Litigation Strategies, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 393, 407 (1989)
("[Tihere is a substantial risk that the will of these expectant mothers will be overborne by
financial needs."); supra text accompanying notes 27-30 (discussing the financial motiva-
tions of participants in C.R.A.C.K.).
What Money Cannot Buy
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
is demoralizing, dehumanizing, and degrading. To commodify that
which is so fundamentally tied to personhood shocked the con-
sciences of the Georgia and New Jersey Supreme Court justices, 103
as it has judges since.' ° To allow C.R.A.C.K. sterilizations, like paid
surrogacy or child sales, is to "step backward from ... [America's]
post-Civil War ... progress toward the decommercialization of
human worth."05
B. Eugenics
No one can reasonably dispute the fact that poor women of
color comprise a grossly disproportionate percentage of
C.R.A.C.K.'s client base. °6 The organization's queues do not origi-
nate in Beverly Hills or on Manhattan's Upper West Side.
Intentionally or not, C.R.A.C.K. promulgates a program of popula-
tion control, or negative eugenics. 107
The field of eugenics, which seeks "to give to the more suitable
races ... a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suit-
able than they otherwise would have had,"'08 has an infamous
history in the United States. Starting in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the field of eugenics grew quickly. By 1931, thirty-two states
had adopted eugenics laws, some of which included statutes for-
bidding the marriage of "genetic undesirables."'09 It reached its
apex around 1927, the same year that the Supreme Court issued its
103. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 (discussing Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 1951)); supra text accompanying notes 85-91 (discussing In re
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1987)).
104. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 93-98 (discussing the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts' decision in R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998)).
105. Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1763
(1988) (referring to the practice of paid surrogacy).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
107. Negative eugenics is a policy "to discourage the reproduction of genetically infe-
rior individuals." Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1850, 1853 (1981). This is contrasted with positive eugenics, or eutelegenesis, a program to
promote a genetically superior society. See id.
Eutelegenesis has been practiced much less frequently than negative eugenics. See id. An
example of eutelegenesis is the Repository for Germinal Choice, which collects sperm from
Nobel Prize laureate donors and dispenses it to women selected for high intelligence who
desire artificial insemination by donor. See id. at 1850.
108. FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 24 n.1
(1993).




ruling in Buck v. Bel4l11 which approved a Virginia compulsory ster-
ilization law aimed at the "feeble-minded.""' In the years that
followed, for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the
parallel to Hider's extermination of the Jews, Americans began to
express a "growing public antipathy toward eugenic theory.""2
However, C.R.A.C.K.'s promotion of the sterilization of certain
segments of the population once again tells people that they are
"manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."' 3
A review of the congressional hearings on the National Organ
Transplant Act, as well as of the arguments posited opposing the
sale of blood, reveals the reluctance to allow a program that dis-
proportionately affects the personhood of financially
disadvantaged people of color. During the hearings, there was
general agreement that a program allowing organ sales would prey
upon the poor."4 The concern, obviously, was that such an allow-
ance is yet another way of exploiting the socioeconomically
disadvantaged, as "only the poor and powerless will sell their parts
and only the white upper class will be able to purchase them."''
15
These arguments apply equally well to the prohibition of
C.R.A.C.K. sterilizations. To permit class status to dictate the sale of
one's body or the right to exercise fundamental rights to one's
body ought to be prohibited.
Analyzing a policy of a regulated blood market, Richard Titmuss
wrote: "virtually all the [people] who give [blood], by inducement,
for money ... are poor people[,] the indigent, the deprived." 6
Permitting blood sales would thus attempt to "utilize the inept
110. 274U.S. 200 (1927).
111. See id. at 207 ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degen-
erate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."). In Buck, the legal challenges to the Virginia statute were grounded in the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Federal and Virginia Constitutions, see id., a
strategy that had successfully repelled similar sterilization statutes in other states. See 1HARRY
H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 30 (1929).
The Virginia statute authorized the state's Special Board of Directors to order steriliza-
tions for those it found to be "insane, idiotic, imbecile, feeble-minded or epileptic, and by
the laws of heredity [would be] the probable potential parent of socially inadequate off-
spring." Id.
112. Note, supra note 107, at 1854.
113. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
114. See, e.g., National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 282 (1983)
(statement of Samuel Gorovitz); see also Banks, supra note 12, at 100.
115. Note, supra note 62, at 1217.
116. RICHARD M. TiTmuss, THE GIr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY 286 (1997).
What Money Cannot Buy
University of Mwhigan Journal of Law Reform
more efficiently" for the benefit of the rich."7 The disparate impact
on only a portion of the population, based on economic stature, is
untenable when the "item" sold is as fundamental to humanity as
blood. The idea is even more forceful when applied to C.R.A.C.K.
because sterilizations, unlike blood sales, have long-term conse-
quences for the oppressed group.
In both situations, there is understandable concern that the of-
fering of money is the impetus for people of a certain
socioeconomic status to sell parts of their bodies, elements that are
uniquely human. The opposition to blood and organ sales is over
the "commercial exploitation of and potential for abuse, undue
influence and coercion against the vulnerable participants in such
a market."""
The cause for concern is even greater when the permanent loss
of reproductive rights is at stake. C.R.A.C.K., stripped to its barest
elements, is a program that economically entices desperate women
to give up one of the most treasured fundamental rights: the right
to procreate. This fundamental right was first recognized in Skinner
v. Oklahoma, when the Supreme Court stated that the "right to have
offspring" is "basic to the perpetuation of a race."" 9 Ever since, the
Court has vastly expanded a woman's right to procreative auton-
omy.1 2 0 Now, however, poor, drug-addicted, and often homeless
women are being coerced into forever foregoing this valued fun-
damental right.
This disproportionate (on the basis of race and socioeconomic
class) loss of a fundamental right has led some to call C.R.A.C.K a
genocidal program. 2 ' True, it is not a Nazi-esque slaughter, but it
retains the element of diminishing the quantity and quality of the
lives of certain groups of people by targeting the reproduction of
"'unworthy' persons."1 22 C.R.A.C.K. says, in effect, that some people
do not deserve to reproduce. Intentionally or not, it smacks of
eugenics.
117. See id.
118. Banks, supra note 12, at 100.
119. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding the right to an abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold to cover unmarried people);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to avoid pregnancy
through the use of contraception is protected by the Bill of Rights); Katherine B. Lieber,
Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered? 68 IND. L.J. 205, 212
(1992) (citing the right to become pregnant through artificial insemination, and the right
of a woman to control her body during pregnancy by choosing, for example, not to have a
caesarean section procedure).
121. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 11.
122. Banks, supra, note 12, at 105 n.472.
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As a matter of public policy, population control that limits the
reproduction of poor people of color cannot be tolerated. Disal-
lowing the C.R.A.C.K. program would strike a blow to those who
believe that there are socially inadequate classes and degenerative
stocks,23 and who desire to eradicate them through eugenical ster-
ilization.
C. Domino Effect
The previous two subsections addressed the ramifications-both
practical and symbolic-of C.R.A.C.K. sterilizations on society. Now
I narrow the public policy debate to argue that the effects of the
program are severely damaging to one particular group: women,
the subjects of the sterilizations. Specifically, allowing C.R.A.C.K
sterilizations both opens the door to further abuses of women and
negatively alters society's outlook toward women.
Professor Radin encompasses both of these concerns in her con-
cept of "domino effect."2 4 It is a slippery slope argument with a
twist. She posits that an object or attribute cannot be both alien-
able and inalienable, and that when it is rendered alienable, even
in one instance, it will, in time, become completely commodified.'25
This is the slippery slope part of the theory. Next, she aptly recog-
nizes that this transition-from inalienability to partial
inalienability to full commodifiability-changes the social context
by which a society views the item or attribute. 6
1. The Changing Conceptualization of Women-Commodification
forces people to think of the object or attribute in question with
"market eyes." After undergoing the transition to commodification,
an object is suddenly valued for its monetary worth; our previous
valuing of the object or attribute is-subconsciously or not-lost.
"A change would occur in everyone's discourse" relative to the
commodified thing.
2 7
Radin applies this aspect of the domino effect to prostitution,
baby-selling, and surrogacy, or what she calls "aspects of sexuality
123. See LAUGHLIN, supra note 111, at 7, 51 (explaining that "socially inadequate off-
spring" was the term used in the Virginia statute and cited in Buck by Justice Holmes in
reference to Carrie Buck's future progeny).
124. See Radin, supra note 51, at 1912.
125. See id. at 1912-13.
126. See id. at 1913.
127. Id. at 1922.
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and reproductive capacity."28 Exploring the risks of commodifying
such things, she accounts for the externality of the inevitable
changing perceptions about women, women's sexuality, and sexu-
ality in general.'2 "What if sex were fully and openly
commodified?" she asks.130 Her answer: "[a] change would occur in
everyone's discourse about sex, and in particular about women's
sexuality.... The open market might render subconscious valua-
tion of women ... in sexual dollar value impossible to avoid."'3'
Applying the domino effect therefore reveals that "we do not wish
to unleash market forces onto the shaping of our discourse regard-
ing sexuality and hence onto our very conception of sexuality and
our sexual feelings,' 32 assuming, of course, that we wish to con-
tinue valuing sexuality and women in nonmonetary terms.
This result of the commodification of reproduction-
encouraging society to focus on women's reproductive capacities
before seeing women in their totality-is obviously unpalatable.
"[S]ociety will once again value women primarily for their repro-
ductive capacities.' 3, 3 It is unarguably degrading to women to be
seen with "market eyes."
Permitting C.R.A.C.K. payments to women who undergo sterili-
zation has this same unsavory consequence. Much like valuing
women for their reproductive capacities (as is the case with paid
surrogacy), C.R.A.C.K. encourages the devaluing of women for
their reproductive abilities. Framed positively or negatively
(valuing or devaluing), the focus on reproductive capacity is ap-
parent, and the same disturbing consequences arise.
The degradation of women by associating pecuniary interests
with their reproductive capacity has been recognized by courts and
128. Id. at 1921-22.
129. See id. at 1921-36.
130. Id. at 1922. Radin continued:
Suppose newspapers, radio, TV, and billboards advertised sexual services as imagina-
tively and vividly as they advertise computer services, health clubs, or soft drinks.
Suppose the sexual partner of your choice could be ordered through a catalog, or









legislatures.'" The justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that "the payment of money to a 'surrogate' mother... [is] poten-
tially degrading to women.'55 Justice Kennard, of the California
Supreme Court, echoed similar sentiments: "treating the female
reproductive capacity... as [a] product[] that can be bought and
sold" is dehumanizing.s 6 He was concerned that the commodifica-
tion of reproductive rights will "reinforce oppressive gender
stereotypes.,
3 1
Whether in the context of paid surrogacy or C.R.A.C.K. steriliza-
tions, allowing such payment will naturally shift our
conceptualization of women and their roles in society. In the ab-
sence of these practices, we are less likely to view women as animals
or "human incubators"1 3 8 that must be spayed or shut down, and
more likely to further a societal construct of "fully developed per-
sons." 39 Permitting such programs, on the other hand, will mark a
significant step backward from the gains made since the women's
rights movement changed the way we value and conceptualize
women.
2. The Slippery Slope-The premise upon which Radin's
"changing societal conceptions" theory is based is that once we
recognize some element of monetization in a certain object or at-
tribute, complete commodification is not far behind.' 4° The theory
is well-known: once the ball starts rolling, there is no telling if it will
stop. Making matters worse, the scope of the slippery slope is
boundless; C.R.A.C.K. can be expanded to encompass different
groups or the same or different groups in a related area. Currently,
134. See, e.g., Glenda Thornton, Rorida Senators Address Surrogate Motherhood, 15 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 885, 894 (1987) (discussing a Florida Senate Bill prohibiting compensation be-
yond pregnancy-related expenses for surrogacy).
135. In reBaby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1987).
136. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 792 (1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting). The major-
ity's decision acknowledged Kennard's argument. See id. at 784-85. It rejected his claim,
however, concluding that such a concern is better addressed by the legislature than a court.
See id. at 784. In dicta, it conclusively refuted the "untoward results" that Kennard discussed,
without further engaging the subject. Id. at 785.
137. Id. at 792.
138. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209,
214 (Ky. 1986) (Vance,J., dissenting).
139. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 1013-15
(1982) (arguing that we must be wary of programs that diminish our prospects of
"express[ing] personhood" because this often limits our "opportunities to become fully
developed persons").
140. See Radin, supra note 51, at 1912-13 ("[Dlomino theory assumes that for some
things... the commodified and noncommodified versions of some interactions cannot
coexist .... Under this theory, the existence of some commodified sexual interactions will
contaminate or infiltrate everyone's sexuality so that all sexual relationships will become
commodified.").
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the program extends to current and former drug addicts. What,
however, is preventing the program from including other disfa-
vored groups?' 4' Why would the natural progression of C.R.A.C.K.
not be to pay for sterilizations of people with hereditary diseases?
What about the mentally handicapped? Or the physically handi-
capped? Members of these groups, like drug addicts, are easy
targets for such a program. They have minimal political power and
are often viewed as burdens on the state.
Women who abuse alcohol are likely future targets, as well. 4 2 But
if we can pay all these women to forego their reproductive capabili-
ties, why not include smokers? While we are at it, should we not
encourage sterilization for those who have been exposed to toxic
substances or who lift heavy objects, as they subject their children
to higher incidences of physical and/or emotional impairments?
43
It is not at all inconceivable for a wealthy anti-Semite, racist, or
classist, witnessing the emergence ofC.R.A.C.K. as a sign of hope,
to promulgate a program of his or her own. The symbolic and
practical results would be devastating. "In evil or reckless hands.
[eugenical sterilization] can cause races or types [that] are inimical
to the [sterilizer's] group to wither and disappear."'"
Unless checked now, C.R.A.C.K. or another organization could
spin off like-minded programs in areas unrelated to sterilization, in
addition to the broadened sterilization programs mentioned
above. For example, an organization could offer money to indi-
viduals to relinquish their fundamental right to free speech; do we
want to open the door to a program that purchases people's right
to protest a program or policy they find detestable? What about a
group, operating under the auspices of furthering criminal justice,
that pays indigent criminal defendants to waive their Miranda
rights? There clearly are rights that we hold dear that should not
be monetized, and we cannot allow C.R.A.C.K. to erode this under-
standing.
Such ramifications concerned Titmuss, who worried decades ago
that if we allow blood to enter an unregulated market, the corn-
modification of previously market-inalienable things would follow
141. This issue mimics concerns over eugenics. See supra Part II.B.
142. After all, fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) affects more than one-tenth of one percent
of the babies born in the United States, and only seven percent of women who drink heavily
have babies without physical or mental impairments. See Michelle D. Mills, Fetal Abuse Prosecu-
tions: The Triumph of Reaction over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 1001-05 (1998). Moreover,
FAS is the leading cause of mental retardation in the Western hemisphere. See id.
143. See id. at 1004.
144. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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closely on its heels. He explained the reason he picked the moneti-
zation of blood to be the subject of The Gift Relationship,
The choice of blood as an illustration and case study was no
idle academic thought; it was deliberate. Short of examining
humankind itself and the institution of slavery-of men and
women as market commodities-blood as a living tissue may
now constitute in Western societies one of the ultimate tests
of where the 'social' begins and the 'economic' ends. If blood
is considered in theory, in law and is treated in practice as a
trading commodity, then ultimately human hearts, kidneys,
eyes and other organs of the body may also come to be
treated as commodities to be bought and sold in the market-
place. 45
Titmuss could not have been more prophetic. The emerging
commodification of human organs after the publication of his
book was one of the major impetuses for passing the National
Organ Transplant Act.'4
The multi-directional slippery slope was, in fact, hailed by Harry
Olson, former ChiefJustice of the Municipal Court of Chicago, as a
positive upshot of the Buck v. Bell decision. Olson contemplated:
"[a]t present the remedy [of eugenics] is used conservatively, but
the road is now open for its much wider application." 47 It is un-
clear what Olson was suggesting. Did he imagine requiring
sterilizations for other "socially inadequate classes"? 48 Did he
fathom inflicting other injuries (not related to sterilization) on the
"feeble-minded"? The possibilities are limitless and horrifying.
The slippery slope is dangerous. The likely-or at least
conceivable-extensions of C.R.A.C.K. are reason enough to se-
riously question the program. The incredible impact on women
and other "target" groups, as well as on unrelated and often un-
foreseeable activities, is enormous. These externalities are too
obvious, important, and powerful to go unnoticed.
145. TiTmuss, supra note 116, at 219.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 170-74.
147. LAUGHLIN, supra note 111, at 5.
148. Id. at 65. In his proposed model sterilization law, Laughlin sought the sterilization
of all those in "socially inadequate classes," including the feeble-minded, inebriates, crimi-
nalistic, deaf, and diseased. See id.
What Money Cannot Buy
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
D. Permanently Relinquishing Reproductive Rights
Thus far the discussion has focused on the public policy argu-
ments related to the injury inflicted by C.R.A.C.K. sterilizations on
groups or society. For instance, commodification of reproductive
rights and eugenics is harmful to society, and the domino effect
negatively impacts certain groups. These are examples of externali-
ties, or repercussions generally not accounted for by the
contracting parties. The following argument, however, centers on
the harm caused to the individual C.R.A.C.K. client.
C.R.A.C.K's sterilizations permanently bar its clients from exercis-
ing their right to procreate. 49 This permanency makes C.RIA.C.K.
even more repugnant. C.R.A.C.K. does not provide the option of
taking birth control pills in exchange for the $200.'50 Rather, the
organization ensures that its clients will never again be able to as-
sert their cherished fundamental right.1
5
1
Consider the situation of Sharon Adams, a recipient of a
C.R.A.C.K. sterilization who admitted that the monetary incentive
was the driving force for her sterilization. 152 She is now completely
drug-free and rebuilding her life. She is also, however, one of the
many healthy, former drug addicts who is now permanently unable
to bear children. The longer C.R.A.C.K continues, the more peo-
ple will be in Adams' situation. No matter how badly she wants to
have children later in life, she will forever be barred from exercis-
ing her fundamental right to procreate.
Similar concerns haunted the Skinner court. In Oklahoma, cer-
tain convicted felons were sterilized, also prohibiting them from
procreating ever again, no matter how and where they lived the
rest of their lives.' 53 Justice Douglas wrote: "There is no redemption
for the individual whom the [sterilization] law touches. Any ex-
149. See Telephone Interview with Rodney Harris, supra note 2 (C.RA.C.K. clients are
given an incentive to opt for permanent sterilization over long-term birth control).
150. See Robertson, supra note 24, at B1.
151. The four sterilization procedures are not technically permanent. However, the ex-
pense of "undoing" a tubal ligation or removing an IUD, the options chosen by 65% of
.RAC.K's clients, is beyond the clients' economic means. Thus, such procedures effec-
tively render the women permanently sterilized.
152. See Berg, supra note 29, at BI.
153. The Oklahoma statute in question (Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (West 1935)) provided for the mandatory sterilization of
people who were convicted three times in Oklahoma of felonies "involving moral turpitude."
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
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periment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty."5 4
In effect, C.R.A.C.K.-like the government in Oklahoma sixty
years ago--decides the future use of its client's reproductive rights
for her, even though the future inability to rear children is proba-
bly the last thing a drug-addicted woman thinks about when she is
enticed into a paid sterilization. As with the felons in Skinner, this
long-term consequence to the individual is unacceptable.
For all of the policy arguments stated above, C.R.A.C.K. is im-
permissible and is a breeding ground for continuing bad social
policy. Part III contemplates which of the traditional forums-
judicial or legislative action-is best equipped to remedy such a
problem.
III. CHALLENGING C.R.A.C.K.
One of the most hotly contested issues concerning organized
opposition to the commodification of the aforementioned
"personhood interests" is the proper forum in which to bring the
debate. 55 Legislators frequently seize upon the matter,' 56 but in the
absence of legislation, courts have been willing to hear such
157
cases.
A judicial solution, however, is unworkable in the C.R.A.C.K.
context. First, it is difficult to construct a cause of action in a suit
challenging C.R.A.C.K.. Unlike in Skinner and Roe, for example,
C.R.A.C.K sterilizations do not involve the state. In the absence of
• 158
state action, due process violations, if they do exist here, are not
154. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493-97, 517-18 (Cal.
1990) (majority arguing that the issue is best left to the legislature, and dissent concluding
that it is the court's duty to issue a ruling on the matter). Compare Savannah Bank & Trust
Co. v. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 1951) (Supreme Court of Georgia voided paid adoption
contract) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.2122(d) (I) (Harrison 1999) (prohibiting compensation
for adoption) and MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1999) (same).
156. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4307 (McKinney 1985) (making organ sales ille-
gal); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Anderson 1982) (disallowing paid adoptions).
157. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1987). "The fact that the Legislature may intervene if and when it chooses.., does not
in the meanwhile relieve the courts of their duty of enforcing-or if need be, fashioning-
an effective judicial remedy for the wrong here alleged." Moore, 793 P.2d at 517 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
158. It is improbable that a court would find that C.R.A.C.K. is a state actor, and there-
fore a possible defendant in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Due
Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the state pays for the sterilizations
and allows donations to C.R.A.C.K. to be tax-deductible, C.R.A.C.K. is neither performing a
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justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment 9  Moreover,
C.R.A.C.K. practices are not likely actionable in tort or contract.'
60
Second, the adequacy of judicial action appears even more
tenuous when one contemplates an appropriate plaintiff and her
remedy. A plaintiff who was not sterilized would likely not have
standing, while a previously sterilized plaintiff would likely not have
a redressable injury.""
A legislative solution prohibiting economic consideration in ex-
change for undergoing long-term or permanent birth control
would be more efficacious. Such legislation could provide simply
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to provide valuable consid-
eration in exchange for another to receive temporary or
permanent sterilization. 
62
Many activists and courts have taken the position that regulating the
field of personhood interests is--for theoretical and practical reasons-
"better suited to legislative expression than judicial judgment."6 3
function that has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state," Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
353 (1974)), nor is it otherwise a state actor.
159. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Assoc. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181-82
(1988) (holding that defendant is liable under § 1983 only if its activity in question consti-
tuted "state action"); Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (same).
160. There does not appear to be any tortious conduct, nor is there a breach of a con-
tract. Moreover, in order to give effect to contracting parties' justified expectations, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2) (a) (1979), courts are loathe to interfere in
a contractual relationship, generally upholding the freedom of contract, see MuRRAy, supra
note 43, at § 93(G).
161. For a general discussion of standing and redressibility, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERALJURISDICTON § 2.3.1 (3d ed. 1999).
162. Federal legislation could be sustained under the interstate commerce clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have [plower... [t]o regulate Commerce...
among the several States"):
It shall be unlawful for any person to provide valuable consideration in exchange for
another to receive temporary or permanent sterilization if the transfer affects inter-
state commerce.
This language mimics the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 and its state counterparts.
See supra note 61, and infra notes 174-75. For a general discussion of federal commerce
clause power, seeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 4.1-.10
(5th ed. 1995).
163. Barnes, supra note 102, at 398 (arguing that the appropriate battlefield for the
paid surrogacy debate is Congress); see also Wagner, supra note 42, at 109 (proposing that




The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts," the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, '65 the New York Superior Court,'6  and the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal'67 all contemplating challenges to paid
surrogacy or paid adoption contracts, agreed that the matter is bet-
ter left to the legislature (even though some of them did, in fact,
invalidate the contracts themselves). The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, in a somewhat related issue, likewise concluded that "the
Legislature should make that decision. " '6
Congress successfully prevented the exploitation of socio-
economically poor citizens by passing the National Organ
Transplant Act,'69 and it can do the same by prohibiting C.R.A.C.K.
sterilizations. Like potential C.R.A.C.K. legislation, the National
Organ Transplant Act and similar prohibitory state statutes sprung
from one private citizen's attempt to commodify the ill-
commodifiable.1
70
In 1983, Barry Jacobs established a corporation in Virginia to
broker human kidneys.' 7' Jacobs' plan was to purchase kidneys
from healthy individuals, and then to sell them to people desper-
ately in need of a kidney for the purchase price, plus $2000 to
$5000 for Jacobs' services. 72 The Virginia legislature passed a bill
less than six months later banning organ sales. 7 3 Several states fol-
lowed suit,' 74 and the National Organ Transplant Act was not far
behind.
Legislators prohibiting organ sales did not enter uncharted ter-
ritory. State and federal legislatures have passed many bills
164. See R,R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998).
165. See Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 213-14 (Ky. 1986). The court's decision, upholding a paid surrogacy contract, was sub-
sequently reversed by state legislation. See supra note 92.
166. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sur. 1986). The court
sent its own written opinion to the state legislature for review and guidance. See Wagner,
supra note 42, at 101 n.441.
167. A California Court of Appeal, reviewing a paid surrogacy arrangement, said that
the questions raised by the agreement are "for the Legislature to consider." In re Adoption
of Matthew B-M, 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 37 (Ct. App. 1991). The court continued: "Given the
impact of surrogacy on both public policy and private lives, we urge the Legislature to do so
expeditiously." Id.
168. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496 (Cal. 1990) (concerning the
recognition of one's property rights to his or her cells).
169. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-506, 98 Stat. 2338 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1991)).
170. SeeNote, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1023 (1985).
171. See id. at 1021
172. See id.
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1997).
174. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-408
(1984); MicH. COMp. LAws § 333.10204 (1992); N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 4307 (McKinney
1985).
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prohibiting the commodification of items and attributes in the re-
production arena. For instance, states prohibit the sale of unborn
fetuses and babies, usually in conjunction with bills outlawing paid
adoptions.' 75 Paid surrogacy is another example. State legislatures
in Arizona and North Dakota have outlawed any type of surrogacy
contract.176 It is illegal in Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Utah, and
Washington to receive compensation in exchange for providing
one's services as a surrogate mother (thus declaring reproduction
market-inalienable) . Michigan has even criminalized paid surro-
gacy, making it punishable as a misdemeanor to engage in a paid
surrogacy contract and as a felony to assist in or broker such a
deal. 78 Other states allow severely regulated surrogacy arrange-
ments. 79 In yet another example, paid adoptions are prohibited by
legislation in at least twenty-four states.'
Most of the abovementioned statutes were enacted by state legisla-
tures. Ideally, however, statutes prohibiting economic consideration
in exchange for undergoing permanent or long-term birth control
would be enacted by both federal and state legislatures.'8 ' While a
federal bill would technically encompass only those transactions
that implicate interstate commerce, its effects would be expansive.
First, a traditionally broad construction of the commerce clause
would likely render all sterilizations subject to this federal law.8 2
While it is possible that a complete ban on paid sterilizations would
take the efforts of the legislatures of all fifty states, passing federal
legislation would seriously impair C.R.A.C.K. and future
C.R.A.C.K.-like programs and practices. Second, even if the current
Court's narrow interpretation of the interstate commerce clause
would cause federal legislation to cover only a small percentage of
175. See Banks, supra note 12, at 103.
176. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (West 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05
(1997).
177. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(a) (Supp.
1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West 1997).
178. SeeMICH. CoMe. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 1993).
179. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 to -B:26 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159
to -165 (Michie 1995).
180. See Thornton, supra note 134, at 892.
181. But see Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings on
HR. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, 98th Cong. 317 (1983) (statement of George Annas, Professor of Health Law,
Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health) (arguing that the regulation of
the disposition of human organs should be a concern of state, not federal, legislatures).
182. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(limiting the powers granted to Congress through the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same).
[VOL. 33:1&2
FALL 1999-WiN-ruR 2000]
C.R.A.C.K. and C.R.A.C.R-like paid sterilizations, federal legisla-
tion could act in conjunction with state legislation to proscribe all
such paid sterilizations.
Titmuss sums up: "It is the responsibility of the state ... to re-
duce or eliminate or control the forces of market coercions which
place [people] in situations in which they have less freedom or lit-
tle freedom to make moral choices. " 83 Legislatures-either or both
federal and state-are appropriate bodies to take such action.
"[T] he Government [is] the one in a position to decide whether to
permit such offers to be made. This society and its government
have the capacity.., to meet the needs of the poor"'84 and have a
duty to "safeguard the public interest.""5 These comments were
made just before Congress passed the National Organ Transplant
Act, and they hold true in the arena of paid sterilizations, which, as
with organ sales, adversely affect society in general and the indi-
gent in particular.'86 With the obstacles to bringing a lawsuit against
C.R.A.C.K., a legislative solution might be the only way to safe-
guard fundamental reproductive rights. It is thus Congress' duty,
in order to promote the health and welfare of its citizens as de-
tailed above, to pass legislation that prohibits paid sterilizations.
CONCLUSION
C.R.A.C.K sterilizations cannot continue. There are better ways
to deal with the problems of SEIs and irresponsible procreation
than enticing drug-addicted women to permanently relinquish
their reproductive rights.
The human impulse to commodify is strong. We are reminded
of this every dayw-when thousands of people, men and women, are
arrested annually for prostitution; when one tries to auction off a
183. TITMuss, supranote 116, at311.
184. Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings on H.R
4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Tech.,
98th Cong. 341 (1983) (statement of Dr. Veatch, Professor of Medical Ethics, Kennedy Insti-
tute of Ethics, Georgetown University).
185. Id. at 373 (statement of Dr. Gorovitz, Department of Philosophy, University of
Maryland).
186. See Banks, supra note 12, at 100; Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for
Transplantation: Hearings on HR. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Tech., 98th Cong. 341, 355 (1983) (statements of Dr. Veatch,
Professor of Medical Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University and Dr.
Arthur Caplan, The Hastings Center); Protesters Tear Down Billboard Offering to Pay Drug Ad-
dicts to Use Birth Control AssocIATE PREss NEwswis, Oct. 20, 1999, available in WESTLAW,
Westnews Library, ALLNEWSPLUS File.
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kidney on the internet; 1 7 and when procreative rights sales are ad-
vertised at bus stations. This does not mean, though, that
legislatures should not restrict this impulse. We must look to our
legislatures to protect our freedoms.
Legislators, policy analysts, and lay people must recognize that
there are some things that money cannot buy. If we allow
C.R.A.C.K. to continue, it may expand its reach. Who is next: the
feeble-minded, the criminalistic, the homeless, the diseased and
deformed? C.R.A.C.K is an odious program with serious conse-
quences. It will continue to devastate unless and until legislatures
declare it illegal.
187. See Amy Harmon, Illegal Kidney Auction Pops up on Ebay's Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1999, at A14.
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